Economic governance, regulation and services trade liberalization by FIORINI, Matteo & HOEKMAN, Bernard M.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2017/27 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-265 
Economic Governance, Regulation and Services Trade 
Liberalization 
 
Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
 
 
Economic Governance, Regulation and Services Trade 
Liberalization 
 
  
 Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/27 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman, 2017 
Printed in Italy, May 2017 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote 
work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Policy Briefs, Distinguished 
Lectures, Research Project Reports and Books.  
Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme is one of the flagship programmes of the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI). It aims to: build a community of 
outstanding professors and scholars, produce high quality research and, engage with the world of 
practice through policy dialogue. At the Global Governance Programme, established and early career 
scholars research, write on and discuss, within and beyond academia, issues of global governance, 
focussing on four broad and interdisciplinary areas: European, Transnational and Global Governance; 
Global Economics; Europe in the World; and Cultural Pluralism. 
The Programme also aims to contribute to the fostering of present and future generations of policy and 
decision makers through its unique executive training programme, the Academy of Global 
Governance, where theory and “real world” experience meet. At the Academy, executives, policy 
makers, diplomats, officials, private sector professionals and academics, have the opportunity to meet, 
share views and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations 
and senior executives, on topical issues relating to governance.  
For more information: http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
Many agreements to liberalize trade in services tend to be limited in scope. Concerns about possible 
negative regulatory consequences of services liberalization is one reason for this. In this paper we 
provide quantitative estimates of the impact of governance quality on the magnitude of the potential 
productivity gains of external services trade liberalization, and, in the context of the EU, their 
distribution across member states. Our findings suggest that greater effort to design trade agreements 
with a view to improving economic governance would benefit both the EU as well as its trading 
partners. There is significant scope to incorporate elements of the approaches that have been used in 
the EU single market context into external trade agreements, and to use the latter to further the 
realization of a single EU market for services. 
Keywords 
Trade in services; regulation; trade agreements; economic governance 
JEL codes: F13; F15; O43 
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1. Introduction* 
With the gradual reduction of tariffs to average levels of 5 percent or less in many advanced 
economies, the focus of trade agreements has shifted to reducing nontariff barriers to trade in goods 
and liberalizing trade in services. In both instances, this involves addressing nontariff measures that 
impede the ability of foreign firms to contest markets (Egger et al., 2015). However, because services 
trade involves provision via telecommunications networks, foreign direct investment (FDI) and/or the 
temporary physical movement of service suppliers, barriers to trade in services span a broader set of 
policies than is the case for trade in goods, including measures affecting the physical movement of 
foreign service providers and the establishment of a commercial presence (i.e., engage in foreign 
direct investment—FDI). In addition, because most services provision is regulated, liberalization of 
trade in services is more complex than opening up markets for goods because it may require domestic 
regulators and legislators to consider recognition and acceptance of sectoral regulatory regimes in 
foreign countries, based on a determination whether regulatory regimes are equivalent.  
Recent compilations of prevailing policies across countries by the OECD and the World Bank have 
shown that barriers to trade in services are often significant, translating into estimates of ad valorem 
tariff equivalents that are substantially higher than trade barriers for goods (Jafari and Tarr, 2017). 
There is therefore a presumption that liberalization will lower average prices and expand the variety of 
services on the market. In principle, the rationale for reciprocal exchange of services trade 
liberalization commitments is the same as for agreements to liberalize trade in goods: doing so helps 
small countries to overcome political economy constraints to lowering trade barriers unilaterally, 
while it helps large countries address the terms of trade loss that may be associated with unilateral 
liberalization. However, services liberalization has been problematic in many trade negotiations. Trade 
agreements often exclude services altogether, and, if included, frequently do little to actually liberalize 
trade (Marchetti and Roy, 2008; Fink and Jansen, 2009; Miroudot, Sauvage and Sudreau, 2010). 
Instead, the focus is on reducing the discretion of governments to put in place policies that would 
restrict trade more than currently applied policies do. Resistance to services liberalization is not just a 
matter for trade agreements involving developing nations. Services have also generated controversy in 
trade negotiations between high-income countries: in the TTIP context, civil society groups and 
several EU governments and parliaments made clear their concerns that opening up services sectors to 
greater foreign competition could erode regulatory standards (Young, 2016).  
In this paper we build on recent economic research to argue that trade agreements should more 
explicitly consider the role of economic governance as a determinant of the gains from services trade 
liberalization. Economic governance is understood to span both variables that have an economy-wide 
impact, such rule of law or control of corruption, and the quality of sectoral regulation. 
1
 Section 2 
presents empirical estimates of the quantitative effect of services trade barriers on productivity and the 
impact of country-level economic governance variables. There are substantial differences across EU 
member states in services trade policies towards the rest of the world. There is also significant 
regulatory heterogeneity across EU members that affects the size and distribution of the potential net 
benefits of external services liberalization. Section 3 discusses several features of the institutional 
mechanisms developed in the EU context to balance market access liberalization and sectoral 
regulation in implementing a single market for services. Section 4 contrasts the internal services 
                                                     
*
 We are grateful to Carl Hamilton, Petros Mavroidis and Patrick Messerlin for comments on earlier drafts. 
1
 We therefore use the term economic governance in a broader sense than it has come to be understood in the literature on 
the EU, where it is commonly used to refer to macroeconomic policy disciplines, financial market supervision and 
management of the European Monetary Union – see e.g. Dawson (2015). 
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market integration approaches with those pursued in external trade agreements with third countries, 
and argues the latter could benefit from doing more to emulate dimensions of the internal market 
liberalization experience. The focus to date in EU trade agreements has been limited to labor and 
environmental standards and civil and political rights. While important in their own right, this neglects 
the importance of improving economic governance institutions that determine the magnitude (and 
distribution) of the gains from further opening services markets. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Economic governance and the impact of services trade restrictions 
Services are very heterogeneous. Some satisfy final demand – e.g., recreation, travel, tourism services 
– but many are intermediate inputs into production. Services comprise a substantial share of all inputs 
used by firms. The cost, quality and variety of services available to firms therefore are an important 
determinant of their competitiveness. Sector-specific restrictive trade policies that impact on the 
degree of competition on services markets, and thus markups and sectoral efficiency, will affect 
negatively downstream sectors as well as the performance of protected services sectors themselves 
(Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Empirical studies analyzing the linkages between services trade 
policies and downstream productivity identify sizable positive effects of liberalizing services trade on 
the productivity and export performance of firms.
2
  
In what follows we focus on this dimension of services trade policy, recognizing it is just one, 
albeit important, way such policies impact on economic performance of countries.
3
 The purpose is not 
to assess the overall effects of services trade policies but to illustrate that such effects depend on the 
quality of economic governance. It is well known that the magnitude of the net benefits from 
liberalizing trade in goods depend on country-specific conditioning factors, including the quality of 
local governance institutions (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Freund and Bolaky, 2008).
4
 Recent 
research has shown that this is also the case for services, and that it may in fact be particularly salient 
because of their intangibility and because many services are not storable. These features imply that 
many services are regulated and that provision by a foreign supplier requires a physical presence in the 
relevant market. If so, foreign providers confront not only sector-specific regulatory requirements but 
also will be affected by the quality of economic governance that prevails in host countries.  
Beverelli, Fiorini and Hoekman (2017) use the World Bank’s services trade restrictiveness indices 
(STRIs)
5
 for a cross-section of 57 countries to estimate the following model: 
 
                 (           )                 (1) 
 
where     is the natural logarithm of productivity in downstream sector   in country  ,     is a 
measure of economic governance quality in country  ,     is a control variable (the average level of 
tariff protection for non-services inputs used by downstream manufacturing sector  ) and         is a 
                                                     
2
 Country studies include Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2011; 2016) and Bas (2014); country analyses include Barone and 
Cingano (2011), Bourlès et al. (2013) and Hoekman and Shepherd (2017). Recent empirical analyses of the potential 
benefits from further liberalization of trade in services in the EU include Monteagudo, Rutkowski and Lorenzani (2012), 
Canton, Ciriaci and Solera (2014), Fernández-Corugedo and Pérez Ruiz (2014), Van der Marel, Kren and M. Iootty 
(2016) and World Bank (2016). 
3
 Other dimensions include employment effects and impacts on the productivity of services activities. 
4
 The role of economic governance and related institutions as sources of comparative advantage has been widely explored 
in the economics literature (see Nunn and Trefler, 2014 for a review). 
5
 See Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2014) and http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/. The STRI varies from 0 (no 
restrictions) to 100 (maximum restrictiveness). 
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measure of the effective restrictiveness of services trade policy confronted by downstream sector   in 
country  .6  
The estimated coefficients for         ( ̂) and the interaction term ( ̂) permit a qualitative 
assessment to be made of the impact of higher services trade policy restrictions on downstream 
industries, assuming a non-zero level of demand for services is observed.
7
 Beverelli et al. (2017) find 
that higher STRIs are associated with lower productivity performance in downstream sectors. They 
also find this effect is strongly dependent on the quality of economic governance in countries, as 
reflected in indicators such as the strength of the rule of law, regulatory quality and control of 
corruption compiled by the World Bank.
8
 The estimated marginal effect of reducing barriers to 
services trade on downstream productivity accounting for heterogeneity in economic governance is 
given by  
  
      
̂
   ̂   ̂      where the minus sign in front of the marginal productivity effect 
reflects the fact that reducing barriers means decreasing the values of      which in turn lowers the 
value of      . This marginal effect increases with the quality of governance ( ̂   ) and is 
significantly positive (at a 0.05 percent level of statistical significance) for 65 percent of their sample 
observations. This conditionality result is robust to controls that address measurement and endogeneity 
issues.
9
 
The estimates of the interaction model can be used to calculate the productivity changes associated 
with complete removal of restrictions to services trade. An open trade policy regime corresponds to an 
     value of zero. Therefore, the policy change required by a country to remove all barriers to trade 
in services sector   in country   is given by         . The (negative) variation in the explanatory 
variable       reflecting full liberalization of trade across services sectors is given by:  
 
         ∑               
 
 
The associated change in productivity (expressed in levels) implied by the estimated coefficients ( ̂ 
and  ̂) then can be computed as follows: 
 
             ̂   ̂                (2) 
This expression is country-sector specific. The productivity effect of changes in services trade policy 
is a function of services input intensities at the downstream sector level and two variables at the 
country level: (i) the policy change required to remove all discriminatory barriers to trade; and (ii) the 
quality of economic governance. This methodology permits counterfactual exercises to quantify the 
effects of services policy changes in country   assuming different levels of economic governance 
                                                     
6
         is constructed by calculating ∑              where        is the level of services trade restrictiveness for 
country   and service sector   going from 0 as complete openness to 100 as full restrictiveness and      are a set of 
weights that reflect the use of service   by manufacturing sector j in country  . The input-output matrix for the United 
States is used to calculate these weights to address potential endogeneity issues. Input output weights are given by shares 
of intermediate consumption. For discussion and assessments of the appropriateness of using US weights as an indicator 
of the technological linkages between industries see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Barone and Cingano (2011). 
7
 This interpretation of the coefficients assumes away any (indirect) effect of services trade policy on downstream 
manufacturing sectors that is not channeled through the use of services as intermediate inputs. 
8
 At http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. 
9
 Beverelli et al. (2017) include instrumentation and random assignment of the policy component (      ) of the 
composite restrictiveness indicator; estimation with alternative input-output weights; alternative productivity measures; 
and variations in country and industry coverage. 
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quality. This approach can be used to assess the relative importance of – and interactions between – 
the level of services trade restrictions and the quality of economic governance in country  . 
Governance quality and the impacts of services trade liberalization 
What follows focuses on the case of complete removal of barriers to FDI (mode 3 restrictions in WTO 
speak) in four services sectors – finance, transport, communications and professional services10 – on 
productivity in downstream industries (i.e.,      ). All four of these sectors are producer or business 
services in that their outputs are inputs into production of other sectors of the economy. Complete 
removal of all FDI restrictions is perhaps an extreme example of liberalization that may not be 
achievable in practice, but the goal of the exercise is to identify potential impacts of ambitious trade 
agreements.
11
 Two features of the methodology should be noted: (i) it is partial equilibrium in nature, 
as the focus is limited to sector-specific productivity effects (estimation of the overall net GDP effects 
from removing services trade restrictions is precluded); and (ii) we assume that services FDI barriers 
are removed on a nondiscriminatory basis. These features imply that the magnitude of the sectoral 
estimates will be upper bounds, as no account is taken of factor demand or investment diversion 
effects.
12
 However, the point of the analysis is not the absolute size of potential gains but to identify 
the extent to which such effects are conditional on differences in quality of economic governance.  
The quantification is conducted in the following steps. First, equation (1) is fitted with the 
estimation sample of Beverelli et al. (2017) augmented with few data points for the US (this increases 
the estimation sample from 912 to 930). Second, the resulting estimates  ̂= 0.055 (robust standard 
error 0.029) and  ̂=-0.036 (robust standard error 0.011),13 together with the country specific values of 
institutional quality    , and the country-sector specific values of the policy change needed to remove 
all restrictions to mode 3 services trade         , are used to compute values of       according to 
equation (2). 
Table 1 reports results for the largest manufacturing industry in each of the 20 EU countries for 
which we have data, plus Canada and the United States (columns 1 and 2), as well as for three specific 
sectors: autos, medical products and chemicals. (Data are reported for 2007 as the STRI data are for 
that year). The last 2 columns report each country’s relative rank with respect to the level of prevailing 
barriers to FDI in services and the quality of domestic economic governance. Measures for the latter 
variables are from the World Bank, respectively the Services Trade Restrictiveness Indicators database 
and the Worldwide Governance Indicators database.
14
 Canada and the United States have higher 
barriers to FDI in services than the EU. Across the 20 European countries in our sample, the average 
STRI for mode 3 trade is 16.6, as compared to 25 and 19.8, respectively for Canada and the US. The 
original members of the EU have higher barriers to services trade than more recently acceded 
countries. The average mode 3 STRI for the original 6 EEC members is 22.8, similar to what is 
                                                     
10
 See Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2014) for details on the sectoral classification used in the STRI database. 
11
 In principle these are sectors where full liberalization should be possible. The scenarios do not include any of the sectors 
that have been taken off the table by the EU in its trade agreements, i.e., social, health, education and cultural services 
provided in the public interest. 
12
 Trade/investment diversion issues are likely to be less salient in the case of agreements such as the TTIP given that the 
EU and the US are both large and have competitive markets. 
13
 The estimates obtained for the quantification exercise are almost identical to those in Beverelli et al. (2017). From the 
corresponding specification in Beverelli et al. (2017) (see column 4 in Table 2 in that paper), the estimated coefficients 
are  ̂= 0.054 (robust se 0.031) and  ̂=-0.037 (robust se 0.012). 
14
 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/ and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.  
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observed for Canada and the US, while that for the countries that joined the EU in 1986 or later is 14.4 
– almost 40 percent lower.15 
Table 1: Sectoral Labor Productivity Effects of Removing Services FDI Barriers in EU 
 Impact (%  —current institutions vs. counterfactual) 
Sector: Largest 
Manuf. Sector 
 
Autos 
 
Medical/Instr. 
 
Chemicals 
 
Country Rankings 
 
 
Impact 
%  
 
Sector 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
STRI Governance 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Austria 48.0 machinery 23.9 27.1 53.5 60.8 63.1 71.7 17 5 
Belgium 34.6 chemicals 13.9 21.3 27.3 41.8 34.6 53.0 11 12 
Bulgaria 13.1 food/bev 4.0 18.3 12.7 58.1 11.8 54.1 16 22 
Czech Rep. 8.2 autos 8.2 23.2 16.5 46.9 20.5 58.4 13 18 
Denmark 55.8 food/bev 19.7 19.7 44.2 44.2 52.1 52.1 9 1 
Finland 46.3 comm. eq. 23.6 24.0 46.3 47.0 47.0 50.7 15 2 
France 58.9 food/bev 23.5 33.8 44.6 64.3 56.0 80.8 21 10 
Germany 50.5 machinery 23.7 30.9 57.2 74.7 65.0 84.8 20 9 
Greece 16.8 food/bev 8.0 22.5 10.0 28.1 16.7 46.7 10 17 
Hungary 23.7 food/bev 11.3 25.5 16.2 36.6 23.2 52.3 14 15 
Ireland 33.8 chemicals 13.4 17.1 27.3 34.9 33.8 43.3 6 7 
Italy 18.7 machinery 11.0 29.6 20.5 55.3 25.0 67.4 19 16 
Lithuania 10.3 food/bev 4.1 14.0 7.5 25.3 9.9 33.5 2 20 
Netherlands 53.3 food/bev 19.3 21.2 41.4 45.3 50.0 54.8 12 4 
Poland 15.0 food/bev 6.0 17.8 10.8 31.8 14.4 42.4 7 19 
Portugal 18.0 textiles 9.7 17.4 15.5 27.9 22.1 39.7 4 14 
Romania 10.5 food/bev 3.7 15.6 9.7 41.0 9.5 40.1 5 21 
Spain 21.8 food/bev 9.0 16.0 15.1 26.8 21.0 37.1 3 13 
Sweden 16.7 machinery 7.5 8.1 19.2 20.8 21.2 23.0 1 3 
UK 39.3 food/bev 15.5 20.0 28.7 37.2 37.5 48.6 8 8 
USA 45.4 food/bev 17.1 25.8 41.8 63.0 41.4 62.3 18 11 
Canada 59.8 food/bev 27.2 32.1 58.0 68.5 55.8 66.0 22 6 
Notes: The estimates are derived by the authors based on the empirical analysis in Beverelli et al. (2017). 
“Impact” refers to the percentage change in sectoral labor productivity of removing all barriers to Mode 3 
services trade in financial, transport, communication and business services. “High Inst.” measures effect on 
labor productivity if “control of corruption” was at the level of Denmark (World Bank Governance 
Indicators). Services trade policies from the World Bank Services Trade Restrictiveness Database. Labor 
productivity (output per worker in 2007) from UNIDO industrial statistics database. Sectors based on ISIC 2-
digit classification (Chemicals: #24; Autos: #34; Medical/Instruments: #33; Machinery: #29; Food/Bev: 
15+16; Communication Equipment: 32; Textiles & Apparel: 17+18+19). Estimates are statistically different 
from zero for all countries except Bulgaria and Romania. 
The potential downstream productivity impacts are reported in the columns labeled “current inst.” i.e., 
the prevailing governance situation in each country. Estimates vary widely across countries, ranging 
from 10-15 percent for several Central European countries to 50 percent or more for France and 
Germany. The potential productivity impacts also are heterogeneous across sectors, reflecting 
differences in the intensity of service input use across industries. For any given sector, differences in 
productivity estimates across countries reflect differences in the level of FDI barriers. Economies with 
high estimated potential productivity improvements following services liberalization have high mode 
                                                     
15
 This presumably reflects the fact that accession to the EU for more recent members was a very demanding process, 
encompassing policy conditionality that was not applied to incumbent countries. 
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3/FDI restrictions.
16
 The significant heterogeneity in estimated impacts of services reforms across EU 
countries in part reflects the fact that the EU is not (yet) a customs union when it comes to services 
trade and investment policies. As has been shown by the OECD’s compilation of product market 
regulation
17
 and EU monitoring of the implementation of the Services Directive liberalizing trade in 
services between EU member states (discussed further in Section 3 below) there are significant 
differences across EU economies in the openness of services markets to foreign competition.  
Countries that stand to benefit the most in terms of size of the potential productivity boost from 
services liberalization are those with better economic governance. The lower is the quality of 
governance, the lower the productivity effect of services trade liberalization. Weak economic 
governance explains why the estimated productivity benefits for a country such as Italy are low, 
despite Italy having barriers to FDI in services that are among the highest in the sample, which should 
imply high gains from liberalization. The importance of institutions is illustrated further by the 
columns in Table 1 labeled “high inst.” These replace each country’s governance indicators with that 
of Denmark, the best performing country in the sample. In the case of some countries, e.g., Italy, the 
potential productivity effects double. In many cases EU member states with better governance are 
countries with higher per capita incomes and stronger economic performance than other EU members. 
This may have consequences for political support for external trade agreements such as TTIP. Insofar 
as differences in governance quality affect the distribution of the aggregate benefits of EU-wide 
liberalization of services trade and investment, this may help explain opposition against ambitious 
agreements such as the TTIP that would benefit the EU as a whole. Doing more to address regulatory 
and governance weaknesses would not only increase the aggregate benefits of services trade 
liberalization but as, if not more important, improve the distribution of such benefits across EU 
member states. 
Results of the same exercise for a sample of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) countries and 
Turkey are reported in Table 2. The ENP countries tend to have both higher levels of services trade 
restrictiveness and weaker governance than EU member states.
18
 As a result, the differences between 
potential productivity impacts under current as compared to best practice governance are particularly 
high for many ENP countries.
19
 The economic intuition for the empirical findings is that removing 
restrictions on the ability of foreign suppliers to provide their services locally through establishment of 
a commercial presence may fail to have the expected pro-competitive effect if host countries have a 
weak institutional and business environment. Bad governance may result in foreign firms not entering 
the market, or, in case they do enter, operating inefficiently. 
 
                                                     
16
 The data reveal that EU member states are not fully open to inward FDI. At an aggregate level the STRI data on FDI 
restrictions, which are consistent with those compiled by the OECD in its FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 
(http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm), help to explain why for the EU as a whole cross-border FDI in services 
accounts for only 11 percent of total value added as opposed to 17 percent for goods (European Commission, 2016). As 
goods are much more tradable than services, in principle one would expect that the share of value added generated by 
FDI would be much higher for services than for goods. 
17
 See Fournier (2014b), Fournier et al. (2015) and Nordås (2016). 
18
 However, individual ENP countries are sometimes more open than the EU. Georgia is the least restrictive country 
towards mode 3 in the set of EU and ENP countries. 
19
 This is consistent with the findings of Gylfason et al. (2015) that the trade effects of agreements signed by Eastern 
Partnership countries with the EU have superior welfare implications than agreements with Russia. Gylfason et al. also 
show there is a positive effect of institutions (including both political institutions as measured by the level of democracy 
as well as economic governance indicators such as control of corruption) on export performance of Eastern Partnership 
countries. 
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Table 2: Productivity Effects of Removing Services FDI Barriers, Selected ENP Countries 
 Impact (%  —current institutions vs. counterfactual) 
 Biggest manuf. 
industry 
 
Textiles 
 
Basic metals 
 
Chemicals 
 
Country Rankings 
 Impact
 %  
Sector Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
STRI Governance 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Albania 2.9 textiles 2.9 29.9 4.9 49.7 3.9 39.7 2 (5) 5 (27) 
Georgia 3.9 food/bev 1.9 8.9 1.2 5.7 3.4 16.2 1 (1) 3 (25) 
Ukraine 3.5 metals 2.6 34.9 3.5 46.4 3.8 50.0 4 (23) 6 (28) 
Jordan 50.8 food/bev 34.6 93.1 52.3 140.0 47.8 128.5 7 (29) 1 (16) 
Lebanon 4.3 food/bev 3.0 92.6 4.5 141.1 4.1 127.5 6 (28) 7 (29) 
Morocco 10.5 food/bev 6.7 34.7 9.0 46.8 9.8 50.7 3 (21) 4 (26) 
Memo:           
Turkey 20.5 textiles 20.5 65.9 24.2 78.0 32.9 106.1 5 (26) 2 (21) 
Notes: See Table 1. Sectors based on ISIC 2-digit classification (Chemicals: #24; Food/Bev: 15+16; Textiles 
& Apparel: 17+18+19; Basic metals: 27). Estimates with country specific governance institutions (columns 1, 
3 5 and 7) are statistically significant only for Turkey and Jordan. Country ranking columns (9 and 10) report 
within selection rankings as well as (in parentheses) rankings relative to the larger sample of countries 
reported in Table 1. 
 
The foregoing used control of corruption as the moderator governance variable and labor productivity 
as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports the results for the same exercise using different governance 
indicators and sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) as the dependent variable. The use of TFP 
reduces the sample size substantially due to data availability constraints, but very similar qualitative 
results obtain. In the case of Italy, for example, improving economic governance would increase the 
productivity payoff of removing mode 3 barriers by 50 to 200 percent.  This is of course a very wide 
range, and the variation in the estimated potential effects illustrate that some types of governance 
matter more than others for the impact of services investment barriers. That said, Table 3 shows that 
the finding that the magnitude of the effect of services liberalization is a function of the quality of 
governance practices is robust: it holds no matter what specific measures of governance or 
productivity are chosen as a focal point. 
There is significant heterogeneity in estimated impacts of services reforms across EU countries. In 
part this reflects the fact that the EU is not yet a customs union when it comes to services trade and 
investment policies, but more important is that EU membership clearly does not imply common levels 
of institutional performance.  Thus, there are apparent limitations on what can be achieved through – 
and what is implied by – membership of the EU. In practice this must mean that EU law and 
regulation (the acquis communautaire) is insufficient to drive convergence in the quality of economic 
governance and/or that enforcement mechanisms are inadequate to induce governments to improve 
institutional performance in areas that matter for business investment. 
This raises the question what dimensions of economic governance matter most. To return to the 
example of Italy, its regulatory quality indicator is closer to that observed in better performing EU 
countries
20 
than is the case for the broader horizontal (cross-cutting) governance indicators for control 
of corruption or strength of the rule of law. Therefore, the impact of improving regulatory quality is 
                                                     
20 The regulatory quality indicator is a composite variable that reflects measures such as price controls, ease of starting a new 
business, prevalence of subsidies and state of competition on markets. See 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. 
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less than that associated with improving the other governance variables – as can be seen by comparing 
the results in panel A of Table 3 with panels B and C. These results are consistent with more granular 
data on the performance of institutions. The rule of law result, for example, is consistent with data on 
the number of days required for an average court of first instance to resolve all pending civil and 
commercial disputes. In the case of Italy, this stands at some 500 days on average as compared to 100 
days in Lithuania (Figure 1). However, Lithuania has one of worst scores on control of corruption in 
the sample (see Table 1). This illustrates that analysis is required to ‘unpack’ the governance 
dimension so as to identify what areas should be a priority for institutional improvement from the 
perspective of downstream productivity effects. Different countries will have different circumstances 
and in practice the ‘binding constraints’ and thus priorities will vary across countries and over time. 
Moreover, it may well be that sectoral regulatory institutions are important for specific services 
activities, so that a focus on only horizontal governance indicators is likely to be too narrow. Both 
types of regulation/economic governance will have implications for effects of services trade and 
investment liberalization and thus the potential net benefits of services trade liberalization. Country-
by-country analysis is needed to inform policymakers which types of regulatory and governance 
institutions should be bolstered in the context of efforts to liberalize trade in services so as to increase 
the aggregate net payoffs of services trade liberalization. As discussed further in Section 4, 
incorporating processes to help identify priority areas for (joint) action in trade agreements could help 
increase the benefits of such cooperation.  
Table 3: Total Factor Productivity Effects of Removing Services FDI Barriers 
  Impact (%  TFP —current institutions vs. counterfactual) 
 Biggest manuf. 
industry 
Impact: Autos Impact: Medical/Instr. Impact: Chemicals 
 Impact:  
%  TFP 
Sector Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Current 
Inst. 
High 
Inst. 
Panel A: Regulatory Quality 
Denmark 65.0 food/bev 22.9 - 51.5 - 60.7 - 
Germany 68.5 machinery 32.2 36.0 77.7 87.0 88.2 98.8 
Ireland 49.1 chemicals 19.4 19.9 39.6 40.7 49.1 50.4 
Italy 38.2 machinery 22.5 34.5 42.0 64.4 51.2 78.5 
Lithuania 28.9 food/bev 11.5 16.3 20.8 29.4 27.6 39.1 
Panel B: Rule of Law 
Denmark 60.9 food/bev 21.5 - 48.2 - 56.8 - 
Germany 64.8 machinery 30.4 33.7 73.4 81.4 83.4 92.5 
Ireland 41.8 chemicals 16.5 18.6 33.8 38.1 41.8 47.2 
Italy 21.5 machinery 12.6 32.3 23.6 60.3 28.8 73.5 
Lithuania 18.5 food/bev 7.4 15.3 13.3 27.5 17.7 36.6 
Panel C: Control of Corruption 
Denmark 62.6 food/bev 22.1 - 49.6 - 58.4 - 
Germany 56.0 machinery 26.3 34.7 63.5 83.7 72.1 95.1 
Ireland 37.5 chemicals 14.8 19.2 30.3 39.1 37.5 48.5 
Italy 19.9 machinery 11.7 33.2 21.9 62.0 26.6 75.6 
Lithuania 10.7 food/bev 4.3 15.7 7.8 28.3 10.3 37.6 
Notes: Figures in bold and italics are not statistically different from zero. “Impact” refers to the percentage change in sectoral 
total factor productivity (TFP) of removing all barriers to Mode 3 services trade in financial, transport, communication and 
business services. “High Inst.” measures the effect on TFP if governance variables (regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption, respectively, in panels A, B and C would be the same as in Denmark. TFP estimates are averages for 
2006-2008 as reported in Beverelli et al. (2017). Sectors based on the ISIC 2-digit classification – Chemicals: #24; Autos: 
#34; Medical/Instruments: #33; Machinery: #29; Food/Bev: 15+16.  
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Figure 1: Days needed to resolve civil and commercial cases (1st instance courts) 
 
Source: Authors' calculation from CEPEJ-STAT at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2016/STAT/default.asp 
3. Services liberalization and economic regulation within the EU 
The main focus of trade agreements is to reduce explicit barriers to trade, not to improve economic 
governance, although dimensions of the latter feature to some extent in EU trade agreements with 
developing countries and European neighbourhood countries.
21
 As mentioned previously, the stylized 
fact is that most trade agreements do little to liberalize trade in services beyond what governments 
have already decided to do on a unilateral basis. This is not the case for the EU itself, of course. The 
Single Market goal and associated EU regulations and directives, combined with monitoring of 
implementation by the European Commission, the possibility of infringement procedures and 
challenging specific policies before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and, 
ultimately, penalties for non-compliance, make the EU a very special case.
22
 While the type of 
supranational institutions that have been created in Europe do not exist elsewhere, from a services 
trade liberalization design perspective there is much to be learned from the EU experience for the 
design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with third countries that seek to liberalize trade and 
investment in services. At the same time, the results of Section 2 show that even the very far-reaching 
EU integration initiative is accompanied by continued significant heterogeneity in the quality of basic 
economic governance variables, raising the question what external PTAs might do to improve 
governance in under-performing EU member states. 
                                                     
21
 We return to this in Section 4. 
22
 Börzel, Hofmann and Panke (2012) analyze determinants of compliance by EU member states with EU law and the 
results of infringement proceedings and rulings by the CJEU. Italy has the highest number of pending infringement 
procedures that were open before May 1, 2015. See Single Market Scoreboard: Infringement at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/_docs/2015/09/infringements/2015-09-scoreboard-infringements_en.pdf. 
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Freedom to provide services is one of the four fundamental freedoms identified in the Treaty of 
Rome. To push forward in achieving the goal of a single EU market for services, a specific Services 
Directive (SD) was adopted in 2006 (Badinger and Maydell, 2009). The SD covers sectors accounting 
for some 45 percent of EU GDP. It imposes disciplines on the use of prior authorizations for provision 
of services, licensing for retail stores, specific authorizations for the sale of certain products at retail 
level and economic needs tests for retail outlets (Art. 9). It requires the removal of explicitly 
discriminatory policies such as nationality tests, requirements that a provider establish or join a 
professional body if this has already been done in an EU member state, that the firm’s headquarters be 
located in the country, conditioning operations on economic needs tests, requiring financial guarantees 
or insurance from a host country provider, and involvement of (domestic) competitors in the process 
of granting authorization to operate (Art. 14). It also imposes disciplines on nondiscriminatory 
regulatory requirements that may impede market access– e.g., limits on the number of establishments 
that are permitted or requirements that a firm employ a minimum number of employees (Art. 16).  
A key element of the SD is Art. 15, which imposes disciplines on countries maintaining potentially 
competition-restricting regulatory measures justified on public interest grounds. Such measures– e.g., 
quantitative or territorial limitations, restrictions on the legal form of an entity, requirements 
concerning equity holdings, or price controls – must be transparent. To help assure this, governments 
are required to establish Points of Single Contact – “one-stop shops” where firms can obtain all 
necessary information on requirements that need to be satisfied to provide services in a country. Art. 
15 also imposes specific substantive disciplines. Measures may not directly or indirectly discriminate 
according to nationality and/or, in the case of companies, on the basis of the location of the registered 
office; they must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (a necessity test) 
and not go beyond what is necessary to attain the public interest objective (a proportionality test). An 
important dimension of implementation of Art. 15 is a mutual evaluation process. Member states are 
tasked with assessing for themselves whether their regulatory requirements satisfy the substantive 
criteria of Art. 15 (i.e., necessity, proportionality) and must share their reasoning with other member 
states. The aim is that this process of self-assessment and subsequent peer review will support policy 
reforms where needed and over time lead to a better understanding of alternative, less trade-restrictive 
approaches to attain the public interest objectives through mutual learning.  
An important complementary Directive on professional services (2005/36/EC) requires that 
regulation of service providers be transparent and justified by public interest concerns and establishes 
disciplines for the recognition of professional qualifications. The 2013 revision of this directive 
includes a transparency process anchored on notification requirements and mutual evaluation based on 
criteria very similar to those in Art. 15 SD (e.g., regulations must be proportionate and necessary). All 
member states are required to prepare and share National Action Plans to address inconsistent 
qualification requirements and improve the respective regulatory regimes. As of end 2016, EU 
members had notified over 5,500 regulatory regimes pertaining to professional services providers 
(European Commission, 2017). 
While it has been argued that Art. 15 makes the SD a less powerful instrument of liberalization 
than the original directive proposed by Commissioner Bolkestein because it permits measures that 
reduce competition (e.g., Badinger and Maydell, 2009; Fernandez-Corugedo and Perez-Ruiz, 2014), 
the deliberative approach has had positive results (European Court of Auditors, 2016).
23
 Although 
monitoring by the Commission of prevailing services policies, as does OECD product market 
regulation data, reveals there is still a substantial gap between the vision of a single EU-wide market 
for services and the reality that is reflected in the heterogeneity of regulatory policies across member 
                                                     
23
 The wording of Art. 15 reflects resistance by the European Parliament to the initial approach proposed by the 
Commission under which home country regulatory standards would have to be accepted by host countries. 
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states (see below), the types of procedures put in place to implement the SD have helped to raise 
awareness and understanding of government entities of what is required under the SD and the 
Directive on recognition of professional qualifications, while allowing for balancing regulatory against 
trade liberalization objectives.  
The SD spans measures that impact on market access as well as regulatory policies that affect the 
ability of foreign firms to provide services. A representative market access related provision is the 
requirement in SD Art. 14.1 banning discriminatory requirements based on nationality or the use of 
economic needs tests. An example of a regulation-related requirement is SD Art. 25, which prohibits 
measures restricting service providers from engaging in so-called multidisciplinary activities.
24
 The 
European Commission maintains a database on compliance with the main requirements of the SD for 
fifteen services sectors. For each country-sector pair, the database identifies a number of key policy 
areas embedded in 20 requirements across five key articles of the SD.
25
 The database permits the 
construction of an indicator of the distance or gap between the policy regime prevailing in country  , 
sector  , at time   and the objective specified by the SD embodied in requirement  . This distance 
measure       takes four discrete values between 0 and 1, with 0 (1) indicating minimum (maximum) 
distance from the SD requirement. Intermediate values of 0.2 and 0.8 are defined to account for partial 
compliance with SD requirements. The database spans three years: 2009 (capturing compliance before 
the 2009 transposition deadline), 2012 and 2014.  
Figure 2 provides an aggregate picture of EU member state compliance with the SD requirements 
by plotting country-level simple averages of       across sectors and requirements. The gap has been 
decreasing over time for all countries, with the sharpest reductions observed in the period between 
2009 and 2012. However, full transposition of SD requirements is not observed in any country-time 
pair and there is substantial heterogeneity across member states. Noteworthy is that a number of long-
standing EU member states register above average gaps. The UK, Slovakia and Estonia are the best 
performing countries when it comes to implementation of the SD.  
Figure 3 illustrates the complementarity between market access barriers and sectoral governance. It 
plots the distance between the policy regimes prevailing in EU member states and the “market access” 
and “conduct” requirements for a subset of producer services that are intermediate inputs for other 
sectors, including accounting, architectural, engineering, legal, and tax advisory services. The 
measures correspond to Art. 14.1 (nationality requirements) and Art. 25 (permitting multidisciplinary 
activities), respectively.
26
 As of 2014, with the exception of Cyprus, nationality requirements no 
longer apply in member state legislation (Figure 3, left panel). In contrast, much less progress is 
observed on measures precluding multidisciplinary activities (right panel Figure 3). These data 
illustrate the importance of considering both market access barriers and sectoral regulatory regimes. 
  
                                                     
24
 Art. 25(1) requires member states to ensure that service providers are not subject to requirements which oblige them to 
exercise a given specific activity exclusively or which restrict the exercise jointly or in partnership of different activities. 
25
 The relevant SD provisions are Articles 9, 14, 15, 16 and 25. For a detailed description of the database see Monteagudo et 
al. (2012).
 
26
 Simple averages are used to aggregate individual sectors. 
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Figure 2: Average gap between SD requirements and Member State practice 
 
Note: Country-level simple average of       across covered sectors and SD requirements – see text.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the European Commission SD database. 
Figure 3: Gap between SD and applied policies, selected sectors and requirements 
 
Notes: The two panels plot the country-level simple average of       across five business sectors (accounting, 
architectural, engineering, legal, and tax advising services) for requirements corresponding to SD Art. 14.1 
(left panel) and SD Art. 25 (right panel). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the European Commission SD database. 
Because regulatory measures that give rise to trade restrictive effects may be appropriate to achieve 
public interest objectives, the process of monitoring applied policies and the mutual evaluation of the 
necessity and proportionality of regulatory measures are key ingredients to promote compliance with 
Economic Governance, Regulation and Services Trade Liberalization 
 
 13 
 
 
commitments. The transparency and review processes also provide for a stronger basis for eventual 
action to address non-compliance and resolve conflicts. In the EU, formal infringement proceedings 
by the Commission against member states are an important enforcement instrument that is not 
available under inter-governmental trade agreements, which are limited to State-to-State dispute 
settlement procedures. In practice, however, a variety of other mechanisms are used more frequently 
to support compliance by member states with EU rules. These include issuing country-specific 
recommendations and pre-infringement procedures. An example of the latter is the EU Pilot, a 
confidential procedure introduced in 2008 that centers on a consultation process in which the 
Commission flags potential violations, informs the relevant member state and requests 
clarification/rectification of the matter raised. The Pilot is supported by an online database and 
communication tool. It is a fast-track process in which both sides have 10 weeks to respond to each 
other. If a query is not resolved the Commission can open an infringement procedure.
27
 The EU Pilot 
has played a positive role in decreasing the number of infringement cases (Fournier, 2014a; Pelkmans 
and Brito, 2012). 
An alternative conflict resolution-cum-implementation mechanism used in the EU is the SOLVIT 
network. This was created in 2002 and allows individuals and firms to raise instances of perceived 
non-compliance with EU legislation by an EU government with a national center established in each 
member state (usually an office in the responsible Ministry). The aim is to use administrative dispute 
settlement mechanisms as well as greater transparency and peer pressure as a problem-solving tool. 
Most cases addressed by SOLVIT are submitted by individuals.
28
 Cases are registered through an on-
line system managed by the European Commission’s internal market Directorate General, with each 
national SOLVIT center taking up eligible issues brought by a national person (citizen or business) 
with counterpart SOLVIT centers in other member states. Transparency is fostered through a database 
in which both claims and their eventual resolution are registered and documented. The goal of 
SOLVIT is to offer EU citizens and businesses an avenue to resolve disputes rapidly without having to 
go to court – a key feature of the system is that it does not involve legal proceedings, although it does 
not preclude this (i.e., SOLVIT is a mechanism that operates in the shadow of the law and hierarchy – 
see e.g., Börzel, 2010). The total caseload of the network has risen steadily since 2002 to over 2,000 
cases per year in 2014 and 2015, with a resolution rate of over 85 percent.
29
  
In an assessment of European Commission enforcement of the SD, the Court of Auditors 
concluded limited use has been made of the EU Pilot and SOLVIT to address non-compliance with the 
SD. Less than one (four) percent of all SOLVIT (Pilot) cases addressed matters covered by the SD. 
The auditors also concluded that the number of formal infringement cases (nine) in the period between 
2006 and 2014 was very low (European Court of Auditors, 2016). In its reply the European 
Commission noted the need to differentiate between elements of the SD that impose unconditional 
(legally binding) obligations and those involving assessments of proportionality and necessity and 
mutual evaluation processes. The latter are more of a conditional nature and involve regular 
                                                     
27
 The Commission started some 900 cases and processed almost 1,000 cases during 2015, resulting in 1,260 open cases at 
the end of that year. The resolution rate of these EU pilot cases in 2014/2015 was around 75 percent. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/eu_pilot/index_en.htm. 
28
 In 2005 the number of SOLVIT cases submitted by citizens (309) was approximately twice the number of the cases 
submitted by firms (142). By 2015, the number of citizens’ cases had increased to 2,121, while those brought by 
companies had fallen to 107 (European Commission, 2016b).  
29
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/solvit/index_en.htm. (accessed March 
1, 2017). See Pelkmans and Brito (2012), Guimarães and Egan (2012), Holbolth and Martinsen (2103), Vifell and 
Sjögren (2014), and Martinsen and Hobolth (2016) for analyses of SOLVIT. Martinsen and Hobolth (2016) conclude that 
most resolved cases are associated with a change in administrative practices. 
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interaction, analysis, sharing of experience and reflection on what constitutes good practice, and 
therefore call for a broader perspective on compliance when assessing the SD. 
4. Revisiting trade agreements to support services liberalization 
Summing up, the forgoing brief review and discussion of the EU experience illustrates: (i) that 
liberalization of trade and investment in services is very difficult – even in a setting like the EU where 
there is supranational enforcement; (ii) the necessity of focusing on sector-specific regulation as well 
as explicit barriers to trade and investment; and (iii) that a purely top down approach is neither feasible 
or desirable – learning processes and transparency mechanisms are needed to assess and consider 
whether regulations that impede trade are necessary to attain regulatory objectives. The latter is 
particularly salient for external trade agreements. These increasingly are motivated by a desire to 
reduce the trade costs associated with differences in regulatory regimes across countries. This has 
given rise to concerns regarding the potential erosion of regulatory policy space and weakening of 
regulatory standards. It has become clear that governments and EU institutions need to do more than 
simply assert that any agreement will not erode national or common EU regulatory standards – instead 
trade agreements need to incorporate mechanisms and processes that improve regulatory quality and 
outcomes (Hoekman and Sabel, 2017). These matters go beyond the services liberalization focus of 
this paper but are consistent with the argument made in Section 2 that trade agreements should devote 
greater attention to economic governance quality to enhance the gains from services trade 
liberalization.  
The EU embodies a mix of “top down” disciplines on discriminatory measures and “bottom up” 
approaches involving self-evaluation, peer review and dialogue. Such approaches are not all dependent 
on the supranational nature of EU integration and related enforcement. Substantial elements of the EU 
approach to internal integration can be emulated in external trade agreements that are limited to inter-
governmental cooperation. Both the substance of the disciplines that are embodied in the Services and 
Recognition of Professional Qualification directives, and the monitoring and engagement mechanisms 
that have been put in place in the EU are salient for the design of external trade agreements. Although 
the mechanisms developed in the EU address the role of sector-specific domestic regulation as a 
potential barrier to trade, the linkage between good economic governance more broadly and the gains 
from removing market access barriers discussed in Section 2 is not considered in the SD and related 
directives. Much attention is of course given in the EU context to improving the quality of public 
administration, controlling corruption and the ensuring the rule of law and independence of the 
judiciary, and so forth. However, this proceeds on a parallel track and is not part of the single market 
strategy.  
This is also the case in the EU’s external trade agreements. As far as economic governance and 
regulation is concerned, the focus of EU trade agreements is on “economic and social rights” (ESR) 
and “civil and political rights” (CPR). The EU has long linked trade preferences for developing 
countries to adoption of international conventions relating to ESR and CPR, e.g., in the GSP
+
 program 
(see, e.g., Orbie and Tortell, 2009; van den Putte and Orbie, 2015). Provisions on protection of human 
rights, environmental safeguards and labour standards feature in all recent vintage EU trade 
agreements. ESR provisions increasingly include anti-corruption commitments, e.g., adoption of 
international anti-bribery conventions and measures to enhance public sector transparency (Lejárraga 
2014). Language on such rights often is incorporated in sustainable development chapters and have a 
“soft law” nature.30 The same is true for human rights commitments, although in principle these are 
                                                     
30
 The TPP broke new ground in this area by including a chapter on good governance which criminalized bribery and 
corrupt practices (including corrupt accounting practices) and made implementation of the various provisions subject to 
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more enforceable in that violations can result in abrogation of the agreement (Bartels, 2012; Bilal and 
Ramdoo, 2016). To date this has been the exception rather than the rule, however, and in practice the 
main instrument to promote ESRs and CPRs in EU agreements has been dialogue and development 
assistance (aid) including through the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European 
Development Fund. EU institutions and member states have provided substantial financial support for 
improving different dimensions of governance in partner countries, including for public sector reform 
and legal and judicial development.
31
 
The 2015 EU “Trade for All” communication calls for doing more to use trade agreements to 
monitor domestic rule of law and governance reforms in trading partners, setting up consultation 
mechanisms in cases of systemic corruption and weak governance, and negotiating ambitious 
provisions on anti-corruption in future trade agreements (European Union, 2015, p. 26). This is a 
continuation and expansion of what has been EU practice for some time. The inclusion of ESR/CPR 
provisions is in part a reflection of normative values (i.e., considered desirable in and of itself as 
reflected in the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as being justified by 
international conventions promoting such rights) and in part strategic, to ensure there is “fair trade” by 
levelling the playing field and preventing so-called social dumping.
32
 The EU trade strategy does not 
highlight the complementarities (interdependence) between sectoral regulation/economic governance 
and the expected gains from liberalizing services trade. This may reflect a perception that there is 
limited scope to achieve the latter with many trading partners. However, this neglects the fact that 
opposition to services liberalization may in part reflect regulatory concerns (Hoekman and Mattoo, 
2013). The links between the quality of sectoral regulation/economic governance and gains from 
services trade liberalization do not figure prominently in EU trade cooperation with other high-income 
countries either. There is therefore some disconnect between approaches used in the internal service 
market integration context compared to external trade agreements.
33
 Moreover, in both settings the 
importance of improving national economic governance is neglected. 
Figure 4 provides a very stylized characterization of the state of play in the EU and PTAs with 
respect to provisions on market access on the one hand and governance on the other. The top half of 
Figure 4 focuses on internal EU liberalization and governance, the bottom part on provisions in 
external trade agreements. There are two relevant dimensions – the existence of and access to 
deliberative mechanisms, and the possibility for actors to invoke conflict resolution mechanisms to 
contest specific measures taken by governments or EU institutions. The market access (single market) 
instruments put in place in the EU were discussed in the previous section. On governance variables, 
measures that are inconsistent with the rule of law, fundamental rights and EU values as defined in 
Art. 2 TEU can be contested by private (EU) parties before national and EU courts, including the 
European Court of Human Rights. Art. 7 TEU establishes procedures through which EU governments, 
the Parliament or the Commission working through the Council, can contest violations of EU values 
by a member state, and potentially decide to suspend certain membership rights. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
dispute settlement. However, the TPP precluded the latter to be used to contest the application of national legislation and 
anti-corruption procedures (Transparency International, 2017). 
31
 Between 2005 and 2014 the EU and EU member states allocated over US$60 billion to support governance reforms, 13 
percent of EU development aid. Public administration accounted for 60 percent of these funds; human rights and civil 
society support another one-third. Only 1 percent waent to anti-corruption projects (European Parliament, 2016).  
32
 There is a long-standing debate regarding the role of domestic import-competing interests in lobbying for inclusion of 
ESR provisions as a way of “raising rivals costs” – see e.g., Lechner (2016) for a recent empirical analysis of the political 
economy determinants of inclusion of nontrade issues in trade agreements; Koch (2015) on EU aid conditionality.   
33
 The CETA and the TTIP talks include mechanisms to address the trade-impeding effects of differences in regulatory 
regimes through sectoral regulatory cooperation. While this can promote better regulatory outcomes and reduce trade 
costs (Hoekman and Sabel, 2017), it does not aim to harness complementarities between sectoral economic governance 
and services liberalization. Most CETA provisions relating to regulatory cooperation pertain to goods, not services. 
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Figure 4. Scope for deliberation & dispute settlement on market access/governance matters under EU law and trade agreements 
 EU integration (EU law and regulation) 
 Intra-EU market access restricting measures by: Governance performance by: 
Actor: EU institutions EU governments Partner government EU institutions EU governments Partner government 
EU institutions n.a. 
EU law: EU 
Pilot; 
Infringement 
procedures; 
CJEU 
No 
EU Court of 
Auditors 
Art. 7 TEU; structured dialogue; 
Council det. of breach (w/ 
Parliament consent); sanctions 
Dialogue; potential 
sanctions (e.g., GSP+) 
EU governments 
Council 
dialogue; EU 
Courts 
n.a. No Council; CJEU No Dialogue 
EU persons EU Courts  
SOLVIT; 
national/EU 
Courts 
No EU courts  
National courts; European Court 
of Human Rights; CJEU 
No  
Partner government No No n.a. No No n.a. 
Partner persons No No n.a. No No  n.a. 
 Preferential trade agreement provisions and mechanisms 
 (Extra-EU) market access restricting measures by: Governance performance by: 
Actor: EU institutions EU governments Partner government EU institutions EU governments Partner government 
EU institutions n.a. Council; EU law Dialogue/DSM n.a. n.a. Dialogue/aid 
EU governments Council n.a. No (EU competence) n.a. n.a. Dialogue/aid 
EU persons No No No  No No No (possibly ISDS) 
Partner government Dialogue/DSM 
No (EU 
competence) 
n.a. No No n.a. 
Partner persons No No No No No (possibly ISDS) If national law permits 
Notes: DSM: dispute settlement mechanism under a trade agreement; CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union; n.a.: not applicable. 
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The focus of EU external trade agreements is primarily on market access commitments. These are 
judiciable through State-to-State dispute settlement mechanisms established by each agreement. Legal 
or natural persons do not have direct access to these. Indeed, while EU citizens or businesses can 
contest actions by EU governments that violate EU law, they cannot invoke the provisions of trade 
agreements signed by the EU in national or EU courts (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2014; Petersmann, 
2015). Nor do EU natural or legal persons have direct access to mechanisms to contest the actions of 
partner country governments with respect to market access provisions. Similarly, citizens and 
businesses in partner countries do not have access to mechanisms under trade agreements to directly 
contest non-implementation of market access commitments by the EU or their own governments.  
Because ESR-related provisions in PTAs take the form of soft law, dialogue and technical and 
financial assistance are the main instruments to engage with counterparts and support groups in partner 
countries that have an interest in improving ESR performance. Some elements of governance 
performance may be contestable by natural or legal persons, whether EU-based or from partner 
countries, but this will involve non-trade agreement mechanisms. Examples include claims of 
violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms before the relevant (international) courts – e.g., the 
European Court of Human Rights – and investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures under a 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The former type of legal rights and the claims that they may give rise 
to have little overlap with the type of regulatory and governance institutions that affect the gains from 
services trade and investment liberalization. ISDS cases potentially are somewhat more salient from 
the perspective of addressing regulatory measures, but are limited to cases involving specific instances 
of foreign investment and allegations that (changes in) regulatory policies imply some degree of 
expropriation in violation of specific provisions of a BIT.
34
 However, they are very unlikely to induce 
improvements in the type of economic governance that matters for increasing the economy-wide 
benefits of services trade liberalization.  
Some options looking forward 
Trade agreements covering services could become more effective instruments to support productivity 
growth and increase economic welfare if they did more to raise the profile of broader economic 
governance institutions as well as sector-specific services regulation, and did more to engage with the 
actors who are directly concerned with opening of services markets to greater competition. 
Complementing the current emphasis on market access narrowly defined (discriminatory policies) and 
support for ESR with concerted efforts to generate greater transparency of prevailing measures 
restricting access to markets and related sector-level regulation would help to identify factors that 
negatively affect cross-border economic activity. In practice much in the way of both economic 
governance and sectoral regulation is unlikely to be (ever become) subject to binding disciplines in a 
trade agreement. There are good arguments against this in any event as regulators should have 
discretion in taking action to further the public interest in addressing market failures. However, the EU 
experience suggests that progress can be made through deliberation and peer review processes to 
improve regulatory outcomes while facilitating trade and investment. Currently trade agreements do 
little to encourage compilation of information on prevailing measures or to engage in a dialogue on 
governance-related policies. Monitoring efforts are limited to solicitation and compilation of market 
access complaints from EU firms and concerns from civil society groups regarding the protection of 
ESRs. In principle these feed into the agendas and work of committees charged with overseeing the 
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Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
 
respective agreements, but there is little public information and reporting on the extent to which this 
occurs and what the outcomes are.
35
 
The EU experience reveals the importance of targeting both market access barriers and sectoral 
regulatory regimes, and that the latter is much more complex than the former. Different approaches 
can be envisaged to support greater attention for sectoral regulatory policies and broader economic 
governance variables in trade agreements, complementing the market access focus that is central in 
PTAs. These range from enhanced transparency and policy dialogue type mechanisms that provide 
opportunities for a broad set of actors to engage on both market access and related economic 
governance matters, including self-evaluation and peer review (mutual evaluation) on the one hand, to 
the negotiation of binding policy commitments that can be enforced by businesses and natural persons 
(citizens) on the other. The complementarities between sectoral regulation/governance and market 
access barriers will differ across countries and will also change over time. Thus, priorities and 
solutions cannot be determined ex ante, but call for analysis and deliberation involving government 
officials, regulators and stakeholders focused on reviewing and assessing the performance of 
economic governance institutions. Such deliberation will also generate information on capacity 
constraints, including at local level, that need to be addressed, including a lack of knowledge or 
uncertainty on the part of implementing agencies as to what is required of them.
36
  
Transparency is an important necessary condition for increasing the profile of regulatory and 
economic governance matters. As important is analysis to identify the measures that are most pertinent 
at the sector/services provision level. The prospects for improving governance and regulatory 
performance through a bottom up process of dialogue with stakeholders, learning and peer review by 
partner countries may be better than one based on hard law and binding dispute settlement procedures 
– not least because the latter may inhibit commitments from being made in the first place. The 
experience obtained with SOLVIT shows that many issues arising in the EU single market context can 
be addressed without going to court. Of course, a premise of SOLVIT is that government agencies 
want to comply with EU regulations, i.e., the problem in many cases is the application of local or 
national measures and not discriminatory intent. This is likely to be less the case in the PTA context. 
Nonetheless, analogous mechanisms involving the creation of national focal points could be a positive 
force for gradual improvement in governance and regulation-related areas. Whether or not such 
approaches can be adopted, what matters is to increase the attention for economic governance and 
sectoral regulation and to support processes to identify actions that will increase the benefits of 
services liberalization. This can be made part of the agenda of monitoring activities and the agenda of 
the various committees and summits that oversee the implementation of trade agreements, and could 
build on the experience and lessons obtained from intra-EU integration mechanisms, including the 
single points of contact and the process of mutual evaluation of sectoral regulatory measures.  
A more ambitious approach would be to increase the incentives for governments to implement 
market access liberalization commitments and to pursue better regulation by leveraging the self-
interest of firms. There has been much debate in Europe on the rationale for including ISDS provisions 
in trade and investment agreements. One reason for concern expressed by many opponents is the view 
that firms already have access to national (and EU) tribunals and that there is no need for a separate 
system of arbitration that may undermine the democratic process by contesting what polities deem to 
be welfare-enhancing changes in applicable regulation. ISDS procedures were incorporated into BITs 
for a specific, limited purpose – investor protection. ISDS is driven by the self-interest of investors 
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(and those providing the associated legal services), not by public good considerations. But the example 
of ISDS illustrates that it is possible for states to agree that enforcement of international agreements 
can be delegated to firms. In the trade area, so-called bid-protest (domestic review) mechanisms are an 
element of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). These allow firms to challenge 
ongoing procurement contests and contract award processes that are perceived to violate GPA 
provisions (see Georgopoulos, Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017).  
Creating mechanisms through which firms can to challenge compliance with mutually agreed 
specific economic governance-related commitments would harness private interests to promote the 
public good. A first step in this direction could be to permit recourse by foreign persons to existing EU 
law and regulations pertaining to the Internal Market – as these are measures that have been agreed by 
EU member states and endorsed by the European Parliament. Indeed, this would not constitute much a 
change to the status quo as all such measures are already enforceable. Foreign firms already have 
access to formal and informal dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms if they are established 
in the EU. Extending this possibility to firms that are not established in the market (have not 
established a commercial presence through FDI) could help expand the set of actors with an incentive 
to utilize existing channels to contest perceived violations of EU law and regulation. While this is 
unlikely to be feasible given the strong revealed preference on the part of the EU (and partner 
countries) for State-to-State dispute settlement processes, establishing platforms through PTAs where 
such matters can be raised and discussed can make a positive difference. Although existing 
mechanisms already permit enforcement actions to be taken in cases of non-compliance with EU law, 
the determinants of compliance are complex and multidimensional. As noted by König and Mäder 
(2014) there may be situations where the balance of incentives confronting the European Commission 
are insufficient to motivate enforcement action. If the (political) costs for the Commission of 
sanctioning a EU government are high, enforcement may not occur. Increasing the visibility of 
noncompliance and creating the prospect of action by trading partners may help to swing the balance 
of enforcement towards greater action. The upshot would be that infringement proceedings brought by 
the European Commission through letters of formal notice, reasoned opinions and eventual referrals to 
the CJEU would be complemented by parallel enforcement pressure by trading partners. 
5. Conclusion 
Services account for over 70 percent of GDP and an even higher share of total employment in the EU 
and other high-income countries. While services trade and FDI flows are substantial, the share of 
services output that is traded is much less than is the case for goods. Greater trade and cross-border 
investment in services is an important potential driver of productivity growth. Realizing this potential 
requires not just liberalizing trade in services (removing discriminatory entry-restricting policies) but 
improvements in economic governance. It is well known that there is still much to be done to achieve 
the goal of a single EU market and that this is a core element of improving the economic growth 
performance of the EU (e.g., Mariniello, Sapir and Terzi, 2015; Egan and Guimarães, 2016). Both the 
monitoring exercises by the European Commission and recent data compilation projects by the OECD 
show there is a great deal of variance in both the level of external services trade restrictions across EU 
member states, and the quality of economic governance.  
There is an important asymmetry when it comes to EU trade cooperation initiatives in terms of the 
consideration that is given to regulatory regimes and the quality of governance institutions. In the case 
of EU accession candidate countries very significant conditionality is imposed by the EU centered on 
adoption of EU law, accompanied by extensive technical and financial assistance and comprehensive 
monitoring of progress in converging towards the acquis. In the case of deep and comprehensive trade 
agreements with neighboring ENP countries the focal point is also EU law and practice, but on an à la 
carte basis, complemented by assistance for partner countries to upgrade administrative capacity and 
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regulatory standards and gradually converge towards EU norms in areas prioritized by ENP 
governments. EU trade agreements with developing countries such as the Economic Partnership 
Agreements are much less far-reaching but still address some elements of economic governance – e.g., 
provisions calling for transparency and publication of applicable laws and regulations, or procedural 
rules pertaining to the enforcement of mandatory product standards, as well as soft law provisions on 
ESRs.  
In all these cases the focal point for action is not to improve economic governance and related 
regulatory institutions in trading partners. Nor do EU trade agreements include specific governance-
related commitments that apply to EU member states and that could help attain the Single Market. The 
presumption is that EU law and regulation is the baseline, that all EU member states are in compliance 
with that baseline, and if not, that this is a matter for EU institutions to resolve and EU persons to 
contest. In the case of North-South agreements such as Economic Partnership Agreements between the 
EU and developing economies the discussion in this paper bolsters arguments for the importance of 
complementing or conditioning liberalization on improving economic institutions in countries with 
weak economic governance performance, through e.g., aid for trade mechanisms, so as to increase the 
prospect that expected benefits of implementing an agreement actually materialize. But the case for 
including a greater focus on economic governance and services-sector regulation in trade agreements 
extends to initiatives between high-income economies. This could start with emulating the 
transparency, reporting, peer review and deliberation features of the approaches used in the EU single 
market context to support greater cross-border trade and investment in services. 
There has been much debate regarding the salience of concerns that deep and comprehensive trade 
and investment agreements such as the TTIP may undermine regulatory goals and circumscribe policy 
space. Insofar as this results in reduced ambition and only limited progress to liberalize trade in 
services the consequence will be little in the way of welfare gains (see, e.g., Francois et al. 2013). 
Devoting more attention and effort to improving knowledge and understanding of the importance of 
improving economic governance as part of the agenda of trade agreements could increase the 
magnitude of the dynamic gains generated by trade and investment liberalization. A greater focus on 
leveraging the political visibility associated with implementation of trade agreements to enhance 
transparency of economic governance performance through collection of data and analysis of how 
outcomes depend on governance and sectoral regulation, complemented by creation of deliberation 
mechanisms to foster dialogue on regulatory matters and related learning would help support both 
market access objectives and make PTAs more useful instruments to improve regulatory outcomes. 
Concrete initiatives that could be taken within the framework of existing modalities and political 
guidance for the negotiation of PTAs to move in this direction include extending efforts that are 
already being made to monitor partner country trade policies (the EU Market Access Strategy and 
Database) with collection of data on regulatory measures and economic governance performance; 
fostering greater dialogue and engagement with and between industry associations and other 
stakeholder groups on economic governance matters in both the EU and partner countries; more 
support for sectoral regulatory cooperation (Hoekman, 2015); and greater focus on ex post evaluation 
of the economic effects of implementation of trade agreements.  
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